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MONSANTO, MATSUSHITA, AND “CONSCIOUS 
PARALLELISM”: TOWARDS A JUDICIAL 
RESOLUTION OF THE “OLIGOPOLY PROBLEM” 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Third Circuit’s recent opinion in In re Flat Glass Antitrust 
Litigation1 is the latest installment in a series of U.S. Court of Appeals 
cases2 dealing with the issue of “circumstantial evidence in cases 
involving allegations of horizontal price-fixing among oligopolists.”3 The 
issue, explained and confronted by the Third Circuit, involves determining 
the kinds of evidence or the combinations of evidence of price-fixing in an 
oligopolistic market that plaintiffs must present to survive summary 
judgment.4 At first blush, this question may appear to be settled by the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,5 but in reality, the issue in these cases is 
much more complex.  
The appropriate standard for summary judgment in these cases is a 
question that intersects with a famous scholarly debate, more than forty 
years running, involving two giants in the antitrust field, the now deceased 
Professor Donald Turner, and Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner. 
Beginning with Turner’s seminal article in 1962,6 the debate over whether 
firms in oligopolistic markets can avoid the kind of parallel pricing often 
achieved in less concentrated markets through agreements,7 and whether 
 1. 385 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 2. See, e.g., Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003); 
Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2000); In re Baby 
Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 1999); Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-
Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1993); Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 
478 (1st Cir. 1988). 
 3. Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 358. For an explanation of some of the basic economic theory 
employed in the antitrust field and in this Note, see LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, 
MICROECONOMICS (Foundation Press 2004). Kaplow & Shavell define an oligopoly as “usually 
refer[ing] to markets in which the number of firms is between two and some not very large number, 
say 10 . . . .” Id. at 57.  
 4. Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 357.  
 5. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (“[Summary] judgment . . . shall be rendered [when the evidence 
shows] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.”).  
 6. Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious 
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962) [hereinafter Turner, Conscious 
Parallelism].  
 7. Such agreements would be unlawful under the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
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these firms should be prosecuted, has continued in the courts and among 
law professors and commentators working in the antitrust field.8  
At the center of the debate lies contending views over the natural 
pricing tendencies of firms operating in highly concentrated or 
“oligopolistic” markets. Some commentators, Turner among them, have 
argued that supracompetitive parallel pricing is a natural outcome of a 
highly concentrated industry in which each seller is aware of the pricing 
and production decisions of its rivals because the market is easily 
monitored.9 The courts have been largely persuaded by this view.10 
Increasingly, however, commentators including Judge Posner have begun 
to question the inevitability of “conscious parallelism,” and the wisdom of 
the federal courts in relying on this doctrine in summary judgment 
rulings.11  
Despite all of this discourse, which includes some rather sophisticated 
views of oligopolistic market structure and its effects on the efficacy of 
antitrust enforcement,12 judicial approaches to the issue have varied, often 
tending towards a more orthodox view, skeptical in its approach to 
economic evidence in horizontal price-fixing cases.13 The court in Flat 
 8. Judge Posner’s latest comments on the problem are found in RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW], which presents Posner’s latest 
thinking on the debate, and serves as the defining statement of Posner’s views in this Note. It should 
be noted, however, that Judge Posner has been involved in this debate since the late 1960s, and that 
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra, is a revision of his influential book, RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976). The change in title is due, as Judge Posner 
explains, to the antitrust community’s recognition that the economic perspective belongs in the 
forefront in antitrust analysis; since the publication of the first edition, “other perspectives have largely 
fallen away.” POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra at vii (citing Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the 
Normative Foundation of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219, 236–40 (1995)).  
 For a more historically informed understanding on Judge Posner’s perspective of this issue, see 
Richard S. Markovits, A Response to Professor Posner, 28 STAN. L. REV. 919 (1976); Richard A. 
Posner, Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, the Sherman Act, and Economic Welfare: A Reply to Professor 
Markovits, 28 STAN. L. REV. 903 (1976); Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust 
Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365 (1970); Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A 
Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969); George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. 
POL. ECON. 44 (1964).  
 9. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 10. See discussion infra Part II.D.  
 11. See discussion infra Parts II.B, II.C, II.D.  
 12. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rationalization of Antitrust, 116 HARV. L. REV. 917, 920 
(2003) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Rationalization] (reviewing POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 8 
and observing that “considerable dispute remains about whether any particular structure necessarily 
entails noncompetitive performance, with the Harvard School historically tending to emphasize a 
strong relationship between structure and performance, and the Chicago School emphasizing the 
degree to which firms are able to compete notwithstanding high concentration or the presence of 
dominant firms”).  
 13. Id. at 925 (noting that “[t]he courts have not moved far from the traditional position requiring 
a reasonably orthodox common law ‘agreement’”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss1/4
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Glass recognizes the debate in its reasoning, and presents an interesting 
synthesis in its approach toward the issues raised by the oligopoly 
problem.14 Despite the Flat Glass court’s awareness of the issue, its 
analysis does not differ much from that of most courts. The typical 
analysis in these cases combines several of the positions in the oligopoly 
debate in a poorly blended and contradictory version of the two positions, 
using a mixture of economic evidence of collusive behavior with more 
traditional evidence of conspiracy involving communication among 
competitors, which courts and commentators call “plus factors.”15 Courts 
are frequently skeptical towards the economic indicia of collusion, 
viewing the parallel behavior as unavoidable.16 This skepticism 
unfortunately informs courts’ generally dismissive view of the more 
traditional conspiracy evidence, as well.17 As a result, the summary 
judgment burden is high, and plaintiffs rarely get the opportunity to try a 
case.18  
This Note attempts to lay the groundwork for a judicial resolution of 
the inconsistency caused by the “oligopoly problem” and the courts’ 
current approach in dealing with horizontal price-fixing among 
competitors in an oligopolistic market. Rather than substitute my own 
inexpert views on the economic analysis employed by proponents on both 
sides of the debate, this Note suggests a reorientation of the method by 
which the court system approaches these cases. I propose a new 
government policy under which the Department of Justice (DOJ) or the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) utilize their ability under section 4 of 
the Sherman Act19 and section 15 of the Clayton Act20 to bring suits in 
 14. See In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 358–61 (3d Cir. 2004).  
 15. See id. at 360–62.  
 16. See infra Part II.D.1. 
 17. Id.  
 18. Id.  
 19. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2000). Section 4 provides, in pertinent part: “The several district courts of the 
United States are invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of sections 1 to 7 of this 
title; and it shall be the duty of the several United States attorneys . . . to institute proceedings in equity 
to prevent and restrain such violations.”  
 20. 15 U.S.C. § 9 (2000). This section grants the same authority to proceed in equity for 
violations of the Clayton Act as section 4 of the Sherman Act provides. As Areeda explains, “[t]he 
Supreme Court has understood the power under this statute to embrace ‘such orders and decrees as are 
necessary or appropriate’ to enforce the statute.” PHILLIP AREEDA, LOUIS KAPLOW, AARON EDLIN, 
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 50 (6th ed. 2004) [hereinafter ANTITRUST ANALYSIS] (quoting Northern Sec. 
Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 344 (1904)). As Areeda explains, “the purpose of the decree is 
deemed not to be punitive, and it will not embody harsh measures when less severe ones will suffice.” 
Id. at 50–51 (citation omitted). After fashioning injunctive relief, which may include disposal of 
subsidiary companies, the creation of competing enterprises, mandatory disclosure of patents or other 
trade secrets, and other injunctive remedies, the court retains jurisdiction to make modifications, and 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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equity, outside of the jury system,21 to enjoin practices that may facilitate 
collusion in a concentrated market. This method avoids the current 
standard for summary judgment in such cases, allowing further inquiry 
into the allegedly collusive practices, while eliminating the risks 
associated with antitrust judgments, including the likelihood of private 
treble damage actions.22  
In proposing this course of action, this Note examines some of the finer 
points of the debate from each side, as well as each perspective’s proposed 
solution. Part II examines the historical background of the oligopoly 
problem in the academic literature and the courts. Part III analyzes the 
conflict, and explains the shortcomings extant in the courts’ current 
treatment of these cases. Part IV offers a proposed solution that avoids the 
pitfalls of the current adjudicatory approach and provides an opportunity 
to gain further understanding of the market realities of oligopolies. 
II. HISTORY 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that “[e]very contract, 
combination, . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is 
declared to be illegal.”23 Though courts have long read a reasonableness 
limitation into the Act,24 agreements to fix or control prices by 
competitors at the same market level have long been considered per se 
unlawful.25 It is frequently stated that the violation is the agreement fix to 
prices.26 To win a treble damages award27 in a civil case, the plaintiffs 
may require the defendants to submit reports and allow the Justice Department “visitorial rights” into 
the defendants’ operations. Id. of 51. Of course, the Justice Department and the FTC may seek 
preliminary injunctions as well. Id.  
 21. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, supra note 20, at 74. Areeda points out that while criminal defendants 
and defendants facing treble damage actions “may demand trial by jury,” there is “no right to a jury 
trial in equity proceedings. Id. Further, “the availability of jury trial does not mean that everyone 
demands it. Many litigants recognize the relative unsuitability of juries for determining the complex 
issues of an antitrust case.” Id.  
 22. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.  
 23. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).  
 24. See Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (articulating the 
necessity for a “Rule of Reason” analysis in some antitrust cases, i.e., that though the Act proscribes 
all restraints of trade, Congress intended to reach only “unreasonable” restraints of trade); Chicago Bd. 
of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
 25. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940) (“Whatever 
economic justification particular price-fixing agreements may be thought to have, the law does not 
permit an inquiry into their reasonableness. They are all banned because of their actual or potential 
threat to the central nervous system of the economy.”). 
 26. Id. See also Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 (1982) (“The per se 
rule is grounded on faith in price competition as a market force [and not] on a policy of low selling 
prices at the price of eliminating competition.”) (citation omitted); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss1/4
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need only prove that defendants conspired or agreed to fix prices.28 Courts 
have interpreted this requirement to include “some form of concerted 
action,”29 or a “unity of purpose or a common design and 
understanding.”30  
When faced with a motion for summary judgment in an antitrust case, 
the courts apply the normal standards under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure31 with an important modification. When an antitrust case is 
brought based on circumstantial evidence, the “law limits the range of 
permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence.”32 Perhaps because such 
evidence is easily concealed or destroyed, or because competitors are 
aware of the highly sensitive nature of communications about price, claims 
alleging price-fixing between competitors in oligopolistic markets often 
lack clear and obvious evidence of direct agreement to fix prices. Plaintiffs 
instead often prosecute based on a blend of evidence involving 
Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1979) (“In construing and applying the Sherman’s Act’s ban 
against contracts, conspiracies, and combinations in restraint of trade, the Court has held that certain 
agreements or practices are so plainly anticompetitive, and so often lack . . . any redeeming virtue that 
they are conclusively presumed illegal. . . .”) (citations omitted); United States v. Trenton Potteries 
Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir. 2004) (“The 
existence of an agreement is [t]he very essence of a section 1 claim.”) (internal quotation and citation 
omitted). See also POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 8, at 53 (“[T]he inquiry in a price-fixing case 
became focused on the question whether the defendants had agreed to limit competition.”). Thus, in 
the analysis involved in horizontal price-fixing prosecuted under section 1, courts tend focus on proof 
of the actual agreement, rather than the effects or outcome of the proscribed conduct. To illustrate, a 
conspiracy to fix prices could be entirely ineffectual, and result in treble damage liability. See United 
States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 (1915) (“A Person may be guilty of conspiring although 
incapable of committing the objective offense.”).  
 27. Successful plaintiffs in private actions suing under the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act are 
entitled to treble damages plus attorneys fees. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000). See also 
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, supra note 20, at 58.  
 28. Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 356.  
 29. Alvord-Polk, Inc. v. Schumacher & Co., 37 F.3d 996, 999 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 30. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984) (quoting American 
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946)). 
 31. See Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 
1992) (“A non-movant’s burden in defending against summary judgment in an antitrust case is no 
different than in any other case.”); Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 357 (quoting Intervest Inc. v. Bloomberg, 
L.P., 340 F.3d 144, 160 (3d Cir. 2003)). As the court in Flat Glass explains, 
A court shall render summary judgment when the evidence shows “that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.” In making this determination, a court must “view the facts and any reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary 
judgment.”  
Id. at 357 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) and Intervest, 340 F.3d at 160). 
 32. See Flat Glass, 385 F.3d. at 357.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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communication between competitors and economic evidence of collusion, 
often called “circumstantial evidence” by the courts.33  
In Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.34 and Matsushita Electric 
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,35 the Supreme Court established a 
stringent set of tests for plaintiffs to defeat a motion for summary 
judgment in a “circumstantial evidence” case.36 Monsanto established that 
to survive a directed verdict motion in a concerted action case, plaintiffs 
must present “evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the 
[defendants] were acting independently.”37 The Court revisited the 
summary judgment standard issue in Matsushita, explaining that “antitrust 
law limits the range of permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence in 
a § 1 case.”38 Further, the Court established an informal “sliding scale” for 
the acceptability of inferences from certain kinds of evidence in these 
cases: because an erroneous finding of liability could chill procompetitive 
conduct, “acceptable inferences which can be drawn from circumstantial 
evidence vary with the plausibility of the plaintiffs’ theory and the dangers 
associated with such inferences.”39  
Courts, including the Third Circuit in Flat Glass, have recognized that 
the context of the Monsanto and Matsushita decisions informed the 
stringent standards established by the cases,40 and the standard has been 
 33. See generally supra note 2.  
 34. 465 U.S. 752 (1984). 
 35. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).  
 36. See Gregory J. Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion: Reconciling 
Antitrust Law with Oligopoly Theory, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 719, 751 (2004) (“In recent years, summary 
judgment has been a major hurdle for plaintiffs in cases involving the inference of agreement.”) 
[hereinafter Werden, Collusion]; Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Regulating Oligopoly Conduct Under the 
Antitrust Laws, 89 MINN. L. REV. 9, 27 (2004) (“The Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Monsanto Co. 
v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. erected a high hurdle for section 1 plaintiffs.”) [hereinafter Piraino, 
Oligopoly Conduct]; Robert W. Doyle, Jr. & Andre P. Barlow, Avoiding Summary Judgment in 
Antitrust Conspiracy Cases: Is the Seventh Circuit Pro-Enforcement?, SJ054 ALI-ABA 581, 583 (2004) 
(noting that the standard for summary judgment in these cases is “a difficult one for plaintiffs to win”).  
 37. 465 U.S. at 764.  
 38. 475 U.S. at 588. 
 39. Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1232 (3d Cir. 
1993) (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 594).  
 40. In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d. 350, 358 n.8 (3d Cir. 2004). In Matsushita, the 
plaintiffs relied on a theory that involved a predatory-pricing scheme. 475 U.S. 574. As then Judge 
Breyer explained, predatory pricing is a practice in which: 
[A] firm sets its prices temporarily below its costs, with the hope that the low price will drive 
a competitor out of business, after which the “predatory” firm will raise its prices so high that 
it will recoup its temporary losses and earn additional profit, all before new firms, attracted by 
the high prices, enter its market and force prices down. 
Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 483 (1st Cir. 1988). The Court and many 
commentators have long been suspicious of claims based on predatory pricing, in part because it 
results in low prices. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594 (“[C]utting prices in order to increase business 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss1/4
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criticized by commentators.41 Nevertheless, courts continue to maintain a 
high standard of the type of evidence required to defeat a summary 
judgment.42 Compared with the way in which the government conducts 
enforcement in the merger area, this approach creates an all or nothing 
form of regulation. Either the defendants go to trial facing the prospect of 
treble damages or they win their motion for summary judgment.43 By 
contrast, in a merger case, the government is given notice of the merger 
often is the very essence of competition.”). As the Court explained in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., “It would be ironic indeed if the standards for predatory pricing liability 
were so low that antitrust suits themselves became a tool for keeping prices high.” 509 U.S. 209, 226–
27 (1993). 
 Recent developments in game theory economics and antitrust analysis, however, find predatory 
pricing less implausible. See United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1114–15 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(noting that, “[a]lthough this court approaches the matter with caution, we do not do so with the 
incredulity that once prevailed”). In AMR, the United States was unable to prove that AMR priced 
below an appropriate measure of cost, and the court ruled in favor of the defendants. Id. at 1120. 
 Monsanto was also decided in a separate context from many of the cases involving horizontal 
collusion. The standards established in Monsanto should be viewed in connection with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). In Sylvania, the 
Court departed from its restrictive view of all vertical restraints between manufacturers and 
distributors, holding that vertical restraints that did not affect price had persuasive pro-competitive 
justifications, and should be viewed under a Rule of Reason analysis. Id. at 57–59. The Court’s 
decision in Monsanto relies heavily upon this new standard established for vertical restraints, and is 
tailored to maintain consistency with the Rule of Reason analysis established in Sylvania. The Court 
explains, “If an inference of such an agreement may be drawn from highly ambiguous evidence, there 
is a considerable danger that the doctrines enunciated in Sylvania and Colgate will be seriously 
eroded.” Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763. 
 41. See Hovenkamp, Rationalization, supra note 12, at 925 (arguing that the courts’ current 
approach to summary judgment is “the result of an unfortunate misinterpretation” of Matsushita, and 
that Matsushita “never insisted that any particular kind of evidence of collusion was necessary”). 
Professor Hovenkamp also points out that Matsushita is an especially unfortunate case to create 
precedent because it “spoke in the context of a highly improbable twenty-year-long predatory pricing 
conspiracy and required high-quality evidence to permit such a conspiracy to be presented to a jury.” 
Id.  
 Judge Posner is equally critical of the courts’ handling of the Monsanto standard, arguing that  
[t]he development of the law in this area has been handicapped by an unfortunate dictum in 
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. that to survive a motion for summary judgment the 
plaintiff in a price-fixing case must present evidence that “tends to exclude the possibility of 
independent action” by the defendants. It is unusual to require a plaintiff as part of his burden 
of proof to prove a sweeping negative . . . . 
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 8, at 99–100 (emphasis added).  
 42. See generally supra note 2.  
 43. Defendants will have won their motion largely by showing that the plaintiff’s evidence does 
not “tend to exclude” independent conduct. Thus, in cases where there are equal possibilities of illegal 
and legal conduct, defendants will win and that illegal conduct will go largely unregulated. This lack 
of regulation is likely explained by institutional skepticism within the courts and the government that 
“conscious parallelism” can be avoided. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Correspondence, Workable 
Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1701 (1986) (“Skepticism is why the Workable Antitrust 
Policy School seems to favor little other than prosecuting plain vanilla cartels and mergers to 
monopoly.”). 
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and a minimum of thirty days under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act44 to 
negotiate with the merging parties to tailor their merger to avoid 
anticompetitive effects.45
For a plaintiff alleging a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy, to defeat 
this stringent summary judgment standard, it must show that the firms did 
more than merely price their goods in a similar or even identical fashion. 
Informed largely by the orthodox Turner view,46 many courts seem to 
consider the phenomenon of identical price trends in a highly concentrated 
industry as unavoidable in many cases—a product of market structure, 
rather than evidence of collusion—therefore, as the Supreme Court in 
 44. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2000). The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act is also known as § 7A of the Clayton 
Act.  
 45. Areeda explains pre-merger notification requirements as follows:  
The government has an opportunity (even though not always the resources) to review all 
mergers above a moderate size, because before such mergers can actually take place, the 
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act requires the parties to notify the government 
competition agencies—the FTC and the Justice Department. . . . In cases where there is any 
plausible prospect of a challenge, merging firms will typically commission economists . . . 
and lawyers to write white papers arguing that the merger will not lead to substantially higher 
concentration or prices in any relevant market. To the extent that the merger will lead to 
higher concentration or other competitive problems, the parties often will offer to spin off or 
sell certain assets where this is feasible. . . . After the Hart-Scott-Rodino notification, the 
merger cannot proceed until after a 30-day waiting period, during which the competition 
agencies decide whether they think the merger poses a competitive threat. 
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, supra note 20, at 685–86. The government is not required to approve the 
merger, but notification gives it the opportunity to examine the merger, and negotiate with the parties 
to tailor their mergers in such a way to avoid anticompetitive levels of market concentration. Id. This 
provides for a more robust and sophisticated regulatory environment that addresses the anticompetitive 
effects of concentrated industries while avoiding the chilling effects of treble damage suits or the 
impossible prospects of dismantling a merged firm.  
 Significantly, the government’s policy towards mergers is informed by an aversion towards tacit 
collusion. Section 2.1 of the Department of Justice’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines explains as 
follows: 
A merger may diminish competition by enabling the firms selling in the relevant market more 
likely, more successfully, or more completely to engage in coordinated interaction that harms 
consumers. Coordinated interaction is comprised of actions by a group of firms that are 
profitable for each of them only as a result of the accommodating reactions of the others. This 
behavior includes tacit or express collusion, and may or may not be lawful in and of itself.  
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, § 2.1, issued by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission, April 2, 1992, revised April 8, 1997, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/ 
guidelines/hmg.htm.  
 46. See John E. Lopatka, Solving the Oligopoly Problem: Turner’s Try, 41 ANTITRUST BULL. 
843, 845 (1996) (stating that the Supreme Court’s holding that “mere conscious price parallelism . . . 
does not violate the antitrust laws . . . . was no doubt reinforced by Turner’s analysis and, so bolstered, 
became a bedrock principle, launching in subsequent cases innumerable searches for something more 
than simple parallelism, for plus factors that would transform the defendants’ conduct into an 
actionable conspiracy”) [hereinafter Lopatka, Turner’s Try]. See also infra Part II.A.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss1/4
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Brooke Group explained, “not in itself unlawful.”47 This view is not 
entirely disputed by critics of Turner’s theory; however, Posner and 
others, as discussed infra, suggest a more nuanced, less absolute view of 
the likelihood of parallel pricing.48  
Thus, courts require that plaintiffs show (1) parallel behavior by the 
defendants; “(2) that the defendants were conscious of each other’s 
conduct and that this awareness was an element in their decision making-
process;” and (3) “certain plus factors.”49 In this analysis, a “plus factor” 
refers to “facts or factors” that tend to show that “parallel action amounts 
to a conspiracy.”50 The plus factors identified by the Third Circuit include 
(1) evidence of motive to enter into a conspiracy; (2) evidence that 
defendants displayed actions against self interest, absent an agreement 
among them; and (3) “evidence implying a traditional conspiracy.”51 
However, depending on one’s view of the “economic realities” of highly 
concentrated markets, the first two factors simply characterize the fact that 
sellers in a highly concentrated market will recognize the interdependent 
 47. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993). As the 
Court in Brooke Group explained:  
Tacit collusion, sometimes called oligopolistic price coordination or conscious parallelism, 
describes the process, not in itself unlawful, by which firms in a concentrated market might in 
effect share monopoly power, setting their prices at a profit-maximizing, supracompetitive 
level by recognizing their shared economic interests and their interdependence with respect to 
price and output decisions. 
Id. See also infra Part II.D. 
 48. See infra Parts II.B, II.C.  
 49. Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1243 (3d Cir. 
1993). See also In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 358–61 (3d Cir. 2004); Williamson Oil 
Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1301 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e have fashioned a test under 
which price fixing plaintiffs must demonstrate the existence of ‘plus factors’ that remove their 
evidence from the realm of equipoise and render that evidence more probative of conspiracy than of 
conscious parallelism.”); Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[A] horizontal 
price-fixing agreement may be inferred on the basis of conscious parallelism, when such 
interdependent conduct is accompanied by circumstantial evidence and plus factors . . . .”); Blomkest 
Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1033 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“An 
agreement is properly inferred from conscious parallelism only when certain ‘plus factors’ exist.”); In 
re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Parallel pricing is a relevant factor to be 
considered along with the evidence as a whole; if there are sufficient other ‘plus’ factors, an inference 
of conspiracy can be reasonable.”); In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(stating that courts “require that evidence of a defendant’s parallel pricing be supplemented with ‘plus 
factors’”); Wallace v. Bank of Bartlett, 55 F.3d 1166, 1168 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[P]arallel pricing, without 
more, does not itself establish a violation of the Sherman Act. Courts require additional evidence 
which they have described as ‘plus factors.’”) (citations omitted); Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 660 F.2d 1195, 1201 (7th Cir. 1981) (“Parallel behavior without more (a ‘plus factor’) is not 
enough to establish a Sherman Act violation.”). 
 50. 6 Phillip E. Areeda, Antitrust Law ¶ 1433e, at 212 (1986).  
 51. Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 360 (quoting Petruzzi’s, 998 F.2d at 1244).  
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nature of their price and output decisions.52 Courts will not view 
independent business decisions which take this interdependence into 
account as unlawful.53 Results within the courts vary as to the level of 
clarity and sophistication with which they analyze this type of economic 
evidence.54  
Due to judicial uncertainty regarding the economic evidence 
surrounding interdependence in oligopolistic markets, the third factor 
enunciated by the court in Flat Glass, “traditional evidence” or “smoking 
gun” type evidence of communication between competitors takes on the 
greatest importance in summary judgment rulings.55 This evidence, 
however, is viewed skeptically through the lens of the Matsushita 
standard, which requires “evidence that tends to exclude the possibility” 
that defendants acted independently.56 When, in the court’s view, the 
evidence could be suggestive of either collusion or independence, 
summary judgment will be granted for the defendant.57 This weighing of 
economic evidence and “traditional conspiracy” evidence may be 
legitimate in light of market realities (Turner’s view) or an example of 
failed adaptation by the courts to accept a more nuanced and sophisticated 
understanding of the way in which oligopolistic markets function 
(Posner’s view). This Note next considers each of these possibilities, 
examining several recent attempts to resolve the debate with the teachings 
of game theory, and then offers several illustrations of the treatment of the 
courts’ treatment of the issue.  
 52. See id. at 361 (“[S]ince these factors often restate interdependence (at least in the context of 
an alleged price-fixing conspiracy), they may not suffice—by themselves—to defeat summary 
judgment on a claim of horizontal price-fixing among oligopolists.”).  
 53. See id. at 359–60 (“[I]nterdependent behavior is not an ‘agreement’ within the term’s 
meaning under the Sherman Act.”). 
 54. See discussion infra Part II.D. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See supra notes 34–48 and accompanying text.  
 57. See Piraino, Oligopoly Conduct, supra note 34, at 28 (“Lower federal courts have decided 
simply to grant summary judgment to defendants when the evidence of conspiracy is evenly balanced, 
or is ambiguous.”). See also Re/Max Int’l v. Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995, 1009 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(“[C]ircumstantial evidence alone cannot support a finding of conspiracy when the evidence is equally 
consistent with independent conduct.”); Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591, 599 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(concluding that plaintiff must prove evidence beyond that which is merely “compatible with the 
legitimate business activities of the [defendant]”); but see Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical 
Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 468 (1992) (“The [Matsushita] Court did not hold that if the moving party 
enunciates any economic theory supporting its behavior, regardless of its accuracy in reflecting the 
actual market, it is entitled to summary judgment.”); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in 
Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 439 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Nor do we think that Matsushita 
and Monsanto can be read as authorizing a court to award summary judgment to antitrust defendants 
whenever the evidence is plausibly consistent with both inferences of conspiracy and inferences of 
innocent conduct.”), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 959 (1991).
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A. Professor Turner and Conscious Parallelism 
The thrust of Professor Turner’s argument is that in highly 
concentrated or oligopolistic markets, price outcomes similar to those 
produced by unlawful price-fixing agreements are unavoidable.58 Turner 
first points out that identical pricing in some instances, such as those 
where a large group of sellers produce an identical good (perfect 
competition), is to be expected.59 Price stability is not expected in the case 
of declining demand, excess supply, or other shifts in the market that 
would give an advantage to a producer willing to decrease its price.60 In 
these situations, suspicion that producers have agreed to maintain a price 
is well grounded because market conditions would create profitable 
outcomes for firms to lower prices.61 Turner argues, however, that in 
oligopolistic markets, this kind of price stability can be maintained absent 
a verbal “agreement” among firms.62  
 58. See Turner, Conscious Parallelism, supra note 6, at 666 (arguing that parallel conduct is the 
result of rational decision-making by oligopolists seeking to maximize profits). See also Hovenkamp, 
Rationalization, supra note 12, at 920 (explaining that employing structuralist economic techniques, as 
Turner and other Harvard School antitrust scholars did, led to the conclusion that “poor economic 
performance was inherent in certain industry structures”). 
 59. Turner, Conscious Parallelism, supra note 6, at 659. A perfectly competitive market would 
produce identical prices as a means of meeting consumer demand. With many sellers, each would be 
forced towards the competitive price in order maximize sales. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. Turner explains this situation as follows:  
Suppose, for example, that two hundred producers selling in the same market maintain the 
same price despite a decline in demand that has left all of them operating at about sixty per 
cent of capacity. The decision of each producer to maintain the same price, instead of 
lowering his price in order to expand his sales and utilize more of his idle capacity, makes 
sense only on the following hypothesis—that a general lowering of price would lead to only a 
negligible increase in total sales for all producers (demand is highly “inelastic”); that 
therefore the current price will yield higher profits, or lower losses, for each producer than 
will the price which would be reached by competitive individual decisions; and that 
practically all competitors refrain from shading the established price. But the individual 
producer must have some grounds for knowing that his competitors will not cut price in order 
for him safely to refrain from cutting his own price. In this situation with such a larger 
number of producers, it is virtually inconceivable that the necessary assurance could be 
obtained without a prior actual agreement. With or without agreement, each producer is under 
great pressure to shade the price slightly, because even a large increase in his sales, if more or 
less evenly spread over his competitors, would reduce their sales so negligibly that they 
would not react. Without agreement, this pressure to cut is irresistible. Thus here, in the light 
of the additional facts, conscious parallelism would be virtually conclusive evidence of 
agreement. 
Id. at 659–60.  
 62. Id. at 661. 
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In a market dominated by a few firms, pricing and output decisions by 
one firm affect the sales of competing firms.63 Parallel pricing in such a 
market, Turner argues, can occur “without overt communication or 
agreement,” but through a “rational calculation” of the consequences of 
the pricing decision on competitors and how they are likely to respond, 
and what effect that response will have on each firm’s profits.64 Briefly, 
under Turner’s structuralist model, if Firm A reduces its price, it will take 
sales away from Firms B through F, causing those firms to match the price 
to recapture the lost sales.65 Those sales are made at the newly-reduced 
price, however, so each firm, though making the same number of sales as 
before the price reduction, will make those sales at a reduced price, 
reaping lower profits.66 Rational firms will foresee the negative outcome 
of such price reductions and avoid them.67 In addition to these refusals to 
reduce prices, conscious parallelism can also explain parallel price raises 
through what is termed “price leadership.”68 All of this is achieved, Turner 
maintains, without any “actual agreement.”69  
Despite its anticompetitive effects, courts have viewed this behavior as 
lawful under the Sherman Act.70 Turner contends that prosecution of firms 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. See AREEDA, supra note 50, at 207–08. The Areeda treatise explains the phenomenon as 
follows:  
The first firm in a five-firm oligopoly, Alpha, may be eager to lower its price somewhat in 
order to expand its sales. However, it knows that the other four firms would probably respond 
to a price cut by reducing their prices to maintain their previous market shares. Unless Alpha 
believes that it can conceal its price reduction for a time or otherwise gain a substantial 
advantage from being the first to move, the price reduction would merely reduce Alpha’s 
profits and the profits of the other firms as well.  
Id. 
 65. Turner, Conscious Parallelism, supra note 6, at 661. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 661–62. Professor Turner explains the facts of American Tobacco v. United States, 328 
U.S. 781 (1946), as an example of “price leadership.” Id. at 660–62. See also AREEDA, supra note 50, 
at 170–71. Areeda explains “price leadership” as follows:  
Oligopolistic rationality . . . can also provide for price increases through, for example, price 
leadership. If the price had for some reason been less than X [the price a monopolist would 
charge to maximize profits], firm Beta might announce its decision to raise its price to X 
effective immediately, or in several days, or next season. The other four firms may each 
choose to follow Beta’s lead; if they do not increase their price to Beta’s level, Beta may be 
forced to reduce its price to their level. Because each of the other firms know this, each will 
consider whether it is better off when all are charging the old price or price X. They will 
obviously choose price X when they believe that it will maximize industry profits.  
Id. at 207–08. 
 69. Turner, Conscious Parallelism, supra note 6, at 661, 664–66. 
 70. See In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 359–60 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing In re 
Babyfood Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 121–22 (3d Cir. 1999)). Antitrust enforcement through 
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for “conscious parallelism” presents a difficulty in establishing a 
traditional “meeting of the minds” agreement,71 as well as a significant 
enforcement problem.72 “What specifically is to be enjoined?” Turner 
asks.73 Under Turner’s theory, the behavior of the competing firms is 
rational, and an injunction instructing them not to take the pricing 
behavior of their competitors into account when making their own 
decisions would result in poor business decisions, and would “force the 
sellers to endure competitive losses.”74 Turner proposed legislation 
permitting courts to deconcentrate oligopolistic markets to solve the 
problem,75 but this proposal was never seriously enacted in the legislature 
or the courts.76 Many courts, including the Third Circuit in Flat Glass,77 
continue to view conscious parallelism as a viable explanation of 
oligopolistic market behavior.78
section 1 focuses on the actual agreement, rather than on regulating anticompetitive markets: the law 
focuses on the means rather than the anticompetitive outcome of firm behavior. If the appropriate 
means (agreement) are not evident, Section 1 provides no solution to an anticompetitive market. See 
supra note 26 and accompanying text. See also Turner, Conscious Parallelism, supra note 6, at 662 
(noting that the outcomes of actual price-fixing agreements and conscious parallelism are often very 
similar: “Noncompetitive price levels are maintained, in some cases at or around what they would be if 
the various competitors actually agreed. . . .”). 
 71. Id. at 664, 671 (“I conclude, then, that oligopolists who take into account the probable 
reactions of competitors in setting their basic prices, without more in the way of ‘agreement’ that is 
found in ‘conscious parallelism,’ should not be held unlawful conspirators under the Sherman Act 
even though, as in American Tobacco, they refrain from competing in price.”). 
 72. Id. at 669–70. See also Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 360 (noting that “judicial remedies are 
incapable of addressing the anticompetitive effects of consciously parallel pricing”). Turner also points 
out that whether one considers conscious parallelism to lack an agreement in any sense, or that there is 
a tacit agreement to price a certain way based on an understanding of the market conditions, this tacit 
form of agreement “cannot properly be called an unlawful agreement.” Turner, Conscious Parallelism, 
supra note 6, at 671.  
 73. Id. at 669. 
 74. Id. at 669–70. 
 75. Donald F. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 
HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1230–31 (1969).  
 76. For a discussion of the failure of proposals for deconcentration like Turner’s, see William E. 
Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool 
for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105 (1989). Posner explains as follows:  
These proposals have been abandoned, though less because of confidence that section 1 can 
prevent supracompetitive pricing in highly concentrated industries than because of the post-
1970s skepticism about ambitious governmental intervention in the economy. 
 . . . .  
 Any proceeding to deconcentrate an industry by reorganizing the major firms into 
smaller units would be cumbersome, protracted, and unmanageable.  
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 8, at 101–02. 
 77. 385 F.3d 350. 
 78. Id. at 359–61. See also discussion infra Part II.D. 
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B. Judge Posner and Tacit Collusion 
For decades, Judge Posner has disputed both the economic 
underpinnings and legal conclusions drawn from Turner’s “conscious 
parallelism” theory.79 Posner challenges the assertion that anticompetitive 
effects are an unavoidable outcome of an oligopolistic market structure,80 
and criticizes Turner’s explanation of parallel conduct as unreflective of 
actual market conditions.81 The essence of Posner’s argument is that 
Turner’s structural portrait of an oligopolistic market is not reflected in the 
way firms actually behave, and tacit coordination is a much more difficult 
objective for a group of firms to achieve.82  
Posner’s first objection is that Turner’s observation that sellers would 
hesitate to reduce prices in response to a downward trend in demand 
 79. Professor Turner and Judge Posner’s debate is often viewed as a clash between two schools 
of antitrust, the Harvard School and the Chicago School. The perspective of the Chicago School 
largely won the day, though, as evidenced by Turner’s continued influence on the courts in the issues 
discussed in this Note, the Harvard School’s structuralist perspective still influences some aspects of 
antitrust policy. See Hovenkamp, Rationalization, supra note 12, at 919–20. As Professor Hovenkamp 
explains, “[o]ne important difference between the Harvard and Chicago theories of collusive behavior 
was the Harvard School’s historical embrace of structuralism as a means of approaching antitrust 
analysis, and the Chicago School’s historical rejection of it.” Id. at 919. Pure structuralism, according 
to Professor Hovenkamp, is “the idea that the degree to which an industry deviates from the ideal of 
perfect competition is a relatively strict consequence of that industry’s structure, as defined by the 
number of firms in the market and their relative sizes.” Id. Judge Posner and other proponents of the 
Chicago School reject this analysis, “emphasizing the degree to which firms are able compete 
notwithstanding high concentration or the presence of dominant firms.” Id. at 920. Professor 
Hovenkamp notes the following sources as relevant for inquiries into structuralism: James W. Meehan, 
Jr. & Robert J. Larner, The Structural School, Its Critics, and Its Progeny: An Assessment, in 
ECONOMICS AND ANTITRUST POLICY 182 (Robert J. Larner & James W. Meehan, Jr. eds., 1989); 
Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Antitrust, Ideology, and the Arabesques of Economic Theory, 66 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 257 (1995); COLUMBIA UNIV. CTR. FOR LAW & ECON. STUDIES, INDUSTRIAL 
CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING (Harvey J. Goldschmid et al. eds., 1974); Hovenkamp, 
Rationalization, supra note 12, at 919 n.11. See also supra note 8 and accompanying text.  
 80. See POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 8, at 57. 
 81. See id. at 55–69. Posner bolsters his argument with a Stiglerian analysis of market conditions 
and further observations of the economics involved in concentrating a market. See Hovenkamp, 
Rationalization, supra note 12, at 921. As Hovenkamp explains,  
George Stigler’s groundbreaking article, arguing that orthodox Cournot oligopoly had to give 
way to a more nuanced understanding of concentrated markets that took strategic possibilities 
into account, strongly influenced Posner. Stigler argued that markets differ in numerous ways 
that classic Cournot theory did not capture, a principal one being the means and speed by 
which information is communicated. 
Id. at 921 (footnotes omitted). See also George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 
(1964). 
 82. See POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 8, at 55–69. Posner argues that Turner’s 
distinction between the likely behavior of competitors in concentrated markets and those in 
competitive markets “depends on [the] artificial convention” that firms in concentrated markets will be 
able to predict the outcomes of price reductions by a group of sellers and tacitly coordinate their prices 
with that in mind. Id. at 58.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss1/4
p179 Bunda book pages.doc9/11/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] CONSCIOUS PARALLELISM 193 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(because that price reduction would be swiftly met by his competitors) 
assumes that knowledge about pricing among competitors is immediately 
obtainable.83 If a firm can profit in the interim by shading price, the firm 
has an incentive to do so.84 One of Posner’s more persuasive arguments is 
that the incentive for competing firms to reduce their prices is overstated 
in Turner’s theory.85 When one seller increases its output and reduces its 
prices, some of the existing consumers will shift from purchasing from the 
price-reducing seller’s competitors to the price reducer, but that seller’s 
new lower price will also reach consumers unwilling to buy the product at 
the previous price, i.e., new customers.86 The other sellers in the market 
may not be alerted to the “chiseler’s” price reduction because the 
competing firms may not lose sales in the way that Turner’s model 
predicts because, “[d]epending on elasticity of demand, much of the price 
cutter’s new business may come from outside the market rather than the 
former customers of his rivals [thus] reducing the likelihood of responding 
immediately.”87 In response to Turner’s views on price leadership, Posner 
finds “price leadership” an oversimplification of likely firm behavior in an 
oligopolistic market.88 Price leadership can work equally well in price 
raises as well as price reductions, Posner argues.89  
 83. See id. at 57. 
 84. See id. (Posner argues that interdependence theory “assumes there will be no appreciable 
time lag between the initial price cut and the response; if there is, the price cutter may obtain 
substantial interim profits from his lower price.”). Professor Hovenkamp noted that “Orthodox 
Cournot theory [on which Turner’s theory of conscious parallelism relies heavily] may be an adequate 
explanatory model when each firm in a concentrated market has instant and reliable information about 
the output and pricing decisions of its rivals.” Hovenkamp, Rationalization, supra note 12, at 921. 
 85. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 8, at 57.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 57–58.  
 88. Id. at 59.  
 89. Id. at 59. Posner explains that a thoughtful oligopolist has incentives to shade price, knowing 
that it will gain profits from its competitors, unless they match the lower price. Id. This same firm can 
then raise the price to the higher original level, and following the theory of “price leadership” the other 
firms will recognize the benefits of the higher price, and match the increase. Id. If each firm recognizes 
that it can benefit by raising price more slowly than the price-leading firm, parallel pricing is an even 
less likely phenomenon—absent collusion—than Turner’s theory suggests. Id. If competing sellers are 
aware of the danger that other firms will follow price reductions more slowly, and reap extra profits on 
the way up, they may avoid such price raises out of fear that other firms will benefit during the interim 
period. Id. If firms do reason this way, then it will be difficult for a market to achieve supracompetitive 
price levels in the first place. Id. Posner explains the expected reasoning of the firms in a competing 
market after a price increase as follows: “If I raise my price more slowly than the others, I can increase 
my profits at their expense; should they come back down to my price, it will be time enough to raise 
my price then, and they will follow.” Id. “If oligopolistic sellers reason this way,” Posner explains, 
they may regard the tactics of price leadership as a dangerous business endeavor. Id.  
 In recent years, economists have expended a good deal of effort applying game theory principles 
to oligopolistic behavior in the market. Posner finds that these the “game-theoretic” models “do not yet 
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Posner concludes that behavior characterized as conscious parallelism 
is not as easily achieved without communication and agreement as Turner 
contends.90 An oligopoly only makes this kind of coordination easier, not 
inevitable.91 Posner argues that certain behavior within the market—
“specific economic symptoms of effective collusion”—will indicate 
collusion by competitors.92 Posner advocates a change in the way antitrust 
investigation proceeds, moving away from what he terms the “cops and 
robbers approach to price fixing” which focuses on hot documents.93 
Instead, Posner’s approach integrates the tools of conspiracy law with 
antitrust economics to develop a more sophisticated analysis of market 
conditions and behavior indicative of collusion.94  
Posner suggests a two step-approach, with each step involving a 
complex set of economic factors.95 First, markets must be analyzed to 
determine whether market conditions are “propitious for the emergence of 
collusion.”96 Posner’s second step involves “determining whether there 
yield implications that differ from those of non-game theoretic approaches,” and “[l]ong before game 
theory was a part of most economists’ tool kits, they were well aware of the strategic character of 
competition in markets that had only a few sellers.” Id. at 59–60. Posner points to DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, 
ROBERT H. GERTNER, AND RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 165–78 (1994), for a 
discussion of the implications of game theory to the issues presented here. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, 
supra note 8, at 59 n.10. 
 90. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 8, at 60–69. Posner explains, In order to maintain a 
cartel, the cartelists must agree on a price and output, limit competition over quality (rent-seeking 
behavior that would eliminate the profitable benefits of the supracompetitive price), detect and punish 
chiseling (cheating on the cartel), especially the chiseling in the interim discussed above. Id.; see supra 
note 89. All of this is more difficult to manage than Turner’s model suggests, and involves significant 
transaction costs. As Posner explains, negotiating between two parties requires one line of 
communication; between three parties, three; four parties, six; and five parties, ten. See POSNER, 
ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 8, at 66 n.25. Posner gives the following formula for determining 
communication paths, where n is the number of group members n(n-1)/2. Id. This serves as a rough 
indicator of transaction costs: In a forty firm market, 780 different channels of communication are 
required. This can, of course, be simplified through the use of mass emails, or large industry meetings. 
Of course, those mediums produce physical evidence, the traditional basis for section 1 enforcement. 
 91. Id. at 66 (Posner notes: “It is unlikely that a large number of firms could accomplish the 
complex and delicate task of effectively coordinating their pricing without generating abundant 
evidence of conspiracy. Some degree of concentration thus appears to be a necessary condition of 
successful collusion in markets subject to the Sherman Act.” 
 92. Id. at 61. 
 93. Id. at 61. 
 94. Id. at 79–93. 
 95. See id. at 69. 
 96. Id. According to Posner, markets susceptible to collusion usually include some of the 
following seventeen characteristics. These factors will help antitrust enforcers focus their efforts on 
markets with high potential for collusion. 
 (1) The “[m]arket is concentrated on the selling side.” Id. at 69–70. The more concentrated a 
market, the fewer channels necessary for collusion, as discussed above. See supra note 90 and 
accompanying text. Also, “[c]oncentration interacts with the other predisposing characteristics.” 
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 8, at 70. Posner suggests using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
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(HHI) as a better indicator of market concentration because it more aptly conveys the influence of each 
market participant. Id. For a further explanation of the HHI see infra note 174 and accompanying text.  
 (2) There is “[n]o fringe of small sellers” in the market. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 8, 
at 70–71. A fringe of smaller sellers may be able to raise output in response to a price raise by the 
larger firms, gaining profits away from the large firms, and ultimately inducing a price reduction. Id. 
As Posner explains, “If firms aggregating 20 percent of the market can expand their output by 25 
percent, this will limit the price charged by and hence the profits of the cartel and therefore the 
likelihood that a cartel will be formed or endure.” Id. at 71. 
 (3) The market displays “[i]nelastic demand at competitive price.” Id. at 71–72. If consumers are 
relatively insensitive to price, a price increase will be profitable because the increased price yields 
greater profits, even with the lost quantity sold, demand is said to be inelastic at that point in the 
demand curve. Id. Posner explains this as follows:  
[U]ntil the elastic portion of the market demand curve is reached, raising price will increase 
the colluders’ revenues without reducing the demand for their product proportionately, with 
the result that their total revenues will be rising at the same time that their total costs are 
falling because they are producing less.  
Id. at 71. If this market condition exists, firms have greater incentives to raise prices, particularly if the 
increases are industry-wide. Id.  
 (4) “[E]ntry [into the market by new competing firms] takes a long time.” Id. at 72. This factor is 
relatively simple: If entry takes a long time, or it is costly, then firms are free to raise prices to 
supracompetitive levels, knowing that it will take time for their profits to be chiseled away by entering 
firms excited by the possibility of profits at the current, supracompetitive level. Id. at 72–75. 
 (5) The “[b]uying side of the market is unconcentrated.” Id. at 75. Unconcentrated buyers are less 
likely to have sufficient bargaining power to respond to price increases. Id. A large number of buyers, 
each with a small share of total purchases, have little power to dictate prices to suppliers. Id. 
 (6) The product is standardized. Id. at 75–76. Greater product variation leads to increasingly 
complicated negotiations and agreements over price. Id. The colluding firms will “have to agree on a 
complex schedule of prices for different grades and qualities and this may be impossible to do without 
overt negotiations of the sort likely to be detected by antitrust enforcers.” Id. at 75. In addition, 
detection of “cheating” will be made more difficult by the complexity of the arrangement. Id. With a 
standard product, agreements can be much simpler, and more easily managed. Id. at 75–76.  
 (7) The product is nondurable. Id. at 76. With durable products, incentives to cheat are far greater, 
and such a market is harder to cartelize. Id. As Posner explains,  
The product’s durability means that the seller, with nominally one sale, effectively obtains ten 
sales. And if the seller loses the sale, he loses 10 sales. The profit foregone by losing such a 
sales series is likely to increase the temptation to cheat on a cartel of durable-good 
manufacturers.  
Id.  
 (8) “The principal firms in the market sell at the same level in the chain of distribution.” Id. 
Simply, coordinating a cartel at multiple different levels involves complicated communication 
channels and arrangements. Id. At the same level of distribution, these concerns are less poignant. Id. 
 (9) “Price competition [is] more important than other forms of competition.” Id. at 76–77. With 
fungible commodities on which the only form of competition is price, eliminating such competition 
surely leads to higher profits and provides cartelization incentives. Id. at 76. However, other forms of 
competition, such as “speed of delivery, quality control, warranties, prompt attention to customer 
complaints, and lavish showrooms,” can erode the profits gained by a forming a cartel, and reduce the 
incentive to form the cartel. Id. at 76–77. 
 (10) There is a “[h]igh ratio of fixed to variable costs.” Id. at 77. Firms facing high fixed costs in 
relation to variable costs will face an increased risk of bankruptcy as a result of economic downturns 
or other factors that cause it to reduce its output. Id. Posner explains: 
If bankruptcy is more costly to a firm’s management than a simple failure to obtain the 
difference between a competitive and monopolistic rate of return would be, firms will rate the 
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really is collusive pricing in any of those markets” by examining market 
behavior through several factors indicative of collusion.97 He would not 
benefits from monopoly pricing higher than they would in an industry in which competitive 
pricing would not endanger the firms’ solvency.  
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 (11) There are “[s]imilar cost structures and production processes.” Id. “The more alike the firms 
in a market are with respect to the structure of their costs and . . . their production methods,” Posner 
explains, “the easier it will be for them to collude.” Id. 
 (12) “Demand [is] static or declining over time.” Id. at 77. Growing demand makes collusion 
more difficult to police, because the new consumers in the market mask the chiseler’s effect on the 
cartel. Id. At least some of the business gained by the chiseler will be new business, and that is tough 
for a cartel to monitor or punish. Id. Declining demand and heavy fixed costs “also make entry 
unattractive. . . .” Id. 
 (13) Market “prices can be changed quickly.” Id. at 78. “The faster a seller can react to a 
competitor’s price cut, the less profitable the price cut will be; it will be matched before the price 
cutter obtains much business from it.” Id. Conversely, “[t]he less frequently it can be changed, the 
longer the period within which a price cutter can expect to profit from his lower price.” Id. 
 (14) The industry has a practice of sealed bidding. Id. Sealed bidding is an excellent way to 
prevent chiseling. Id. If the winning bid for a contract is less than the agreed upon price, simply, the 
winner is cheating on the cartel. Id.  
 (15) The “[m]arket is local.” Id. Local sellers in a local market can more easily communicate 
without detection, i.e. there are likely to be fewer people involved in management, and more 
opportunities for face-to-face communication. Id. 
 (16) There are “[c]ooperative practices.” Id. at 78–79. Firms in regulated industries that cooperate 
in “lobbying Congress and the regulatory agencies,” or firms that are “each others customers or 
suppliers as well as competitors” may have opportunities to get to become acquainted and form 
relationships which could foster a collusive business environment. Id.  
 (17) The “industry’s antitrust record.” Id. at 79. “In a market in which collusion is attractive we 
can expect a history of attempts at express collusion. . . .” Id.  
 97. Id. at 69. Posner identifies fourteen economic indicators that point towards collusive 
practices by firms in the same market.  
 (1) Market shares are fixed. Id. at 79. Maintaining identical or nearly identical market shares 
relative to each other is an unlikely phenomenon in markets where firms are actively competing. Id. If 
market shares remain stable relative to each other for a long period of time, it is usually because the 
firms have divided the market, “whether by fixing geographical zones or sales quotas or by an 
assignment of customers,” or some other means. Id.  
 (2) There is a practice of “market-wide price discrimination.” Id. at 77–86. Price discrimination, 
which means “selling the same product to different customers at different prices even though the cost 
of sale is the same to each of them,” Id. at 79–80, is difficult to achieve without monopoly power, and 
firms in a competitive market will not be able to price discriminate. Id. at 77–86. 
 (3) Firms participate in formal “[e]xchanges of price information.” Id. at 86–87. Price information 
exchanges by competitors in an oligopolistic market rarely serve the salutary function it serves in a 
market with many sellers. Although price exchanges can assist a large group of small sellers in 
understanding the market and pricing competitively, in a concentrated market “the problem of 
inadequate knowledge is less serious—it is easier to keep tabs on the pricing of a few rivals. . . .” Id. at 
86. Large firms have the resources to understand the market, and monitor the pricing decisions of 
competing firms. Id. at 86–87. Price exchanges between firms in an oligopolistic market are more 
likely a facilitator for collusion. Id.  
 (4) Price varies from region to region. Id. at 87. Products sold at different prices in different 
regions, absent shipping or other relevant cost differences, may be evidence of collusive pricing in 
some of those markets. Id. “[M]ost price-fixing conspiracies are regional or local rather than national, 
because there tend to be fewer sellers. . . .” Id. 
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 (5) Firms submit identical bids Id. This would be indicative of collusion unless the “item is 
standard, or composed of standard items,” in which case “identical bids are consistent with 
competition because the bidders’ costs may be identical.” Id. Frequently, though, conspirators may 
have the good sense to rotate the low bid amongst each other to mask their agreement. Id. 
 (6) “Price, output, and capacity changes at the formation of the cartel.” Id. at 88. When a cartel is 
formed, the joining firms will raise their prices, and reduce their outputs. Id. As Posner explains, 
“[s]imultaneous price increases and output reductions unexplained by any increases in cost may 
therefore be good evidence of the initiation of a price-fixing scheme.” Id. This approach has the 
distinct advantage, according to Posner, of “enabl[ing] the court to avoid having to make a stab at 
determining what the firms’ marginal costs are or what the competitive price and output would be.” Id. 
This is a difficult task for courts to engage in with certainty. Instead, “[o]ne simply observes price and 
output changes and asks whether changes in costs or in demand explain them or whether the most 
plausible explanation is cartelization.” Id.  
 (7) The market has an industry-wide practice of “resale price maintenance.” Id. at 88–89. Resale 
price maintenance can be used to help a cartel deter chiseling. Id. “When the resale price of a product 
is fixed, it is more difficult for a member of a suppliers’ cartel to cheat. He will gain no additional 
sales by granting a secret discount to a dealer . . . . The discount will be a pure windfall to the dealer.” 
Id. There are procompetitive reasons for resale price maintenance as well, which make this a more 
difficult factor to employ. Id. For further discussion on the legality of resale price maintenance (in a 
vertical context), see State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Contintental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 
433 U.S. 36 (1977); Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections 
on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1977). 
 (8) The market shares of industry leaders show decline. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 8, 
at 89. As Posner explains,  
The charging of a monopoly price will attract new competitors to a market who perceive 
opportunities for unusual profits by reason of the abnormally high price. The existing firms 
could seek to repeal entry by reducing their price to the competitive level, but this would 
defeat the purpose of the cartel; they will normally do better by maintaining a 
supracompetitive price and allowing their market share to decline gradually. . . .  
Id. Though there may be other explanations, long term decline in the market shares of major firms can 
be a symptom of the entry of new firms attracted to the market by the supracompetitive price level 
fixed by the cartel. Id. 
 (9) The “[a]mplitude and fluctuation of price changes,” can be tracked to check for collusion. Id. 
at 89–90. Cartel members may react to changes in demand with a smaller percentage change in price, 
and may change price less frequently than what would be expected in a competitive market because of 
the “difficulty and legal risk in renegotiating the cartel price.” Id. 
 (10) “Demand [is] elastic at the market price.” Id. at 90. Elastic demand at the market price is a 
sign of a monopoly price. Id. A monopolist (or a cartel) would not maintain a price at an inelastic 
demand level because greater profits could be made by reducing output to just below the level where 
demand would be inelastic. Id.  
 (11) The “[l]evel and pattern of profits,” can also be tracked to identify collusion. Id. at 90–91. 
“[W]hen reliable profit data are obtainable, or, often a better alternative, when ‘event studies’ of stock 
prices demonstrate an inexplicable spike in the value of the particular sellers in question, this may be 
evidence of collusion.” Id. at 90 (citation omitted). 
 (12) The “[m]arket price [is] inversely correlated with [the] number of firms or elasticity of 
demand.” Id. at 91.  
Under competition, price tends to be bid down to marginal cost, irrespective of the number of 
firms or other features of the market that might affect the elasticity of demand facing each 
firm at the competitive market price. If the market price is found to vary in the predicted 
direction with changes in these features—for example, if it tends to be positively correlated 
with concentration—this is evidence that the market is not competitive. 
Id. Though this evidence may be the result of other factors, if market price is positively correlated with 
concentration, Posner argues that this can be evidence of collusion. Id. 
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abandon the application of liability for those restraints proved by 
traditional agreement, but Posner maintains that in some cases the 
“existence of collusive pricing” can be proved through economic evidence 
alone.98 Employing this approach, Posner would relax the current 
requirement of physical evidence of actual agreement, given sufficient 
economic indicators.99 According to Posner, searching for direct evidence 
of agreements alone is misguided.100 The method firms use to implement 
price-fixing schemes is irrelevant to their economic effects,101 and antitrust 
enforcement in this area has been stifled by the specious economics of 
conscious parallelism.102  
C. The Contribution of Game Theory: Recent Responses 
Commentator responses to the problems addressed in the Turner / 
Posner debate have not led to much progress. Professor John Lopatka 
remarks that “experience has taught . . . that neither approach is wholly 
satisfying, likely because the oligopoly problem defies solving. . . . 
antitrust is part theater, and ‘the oligopoly problem’ is an act that can run 
forever.”103 Lopatka recognizes that Turner and Posner’s models for 
oligopolistic competition differ because they make different assumptions 
about market information.104 Lopatka’s most poignant criticism asserts 
 (13) The industry prices using a system of “[b]asing-point pricing.” Id. at 91–92. A basing-point 
pricing system is almost always evidence of collusion, and is a modality frequently used to fix-prices. 
For a classic explanation of basing point pricing, see Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 
333 U.S. 683 (1948).  
 (14) “Exclusionary practices” are common in the industry. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW supra note 
8, at 93. Posner includes the following exclusionary practices: tying arrangements, predatory pricing, 
vertical integration, exclusive dealing and bundling, and boycotts. See id. at 193–244. As Posner 
explains, these practices are “feasible only for firms that have monopoly power. If exclusionary 
practices are committed in a market with more than one significant firm, therefore, this is an indication 
that the market is cartelized.” Id. at 93. Simultaneous exclusionary practices are rarely spontaneous, 
and usually arise out of a cartel agreement, or as a means of forming or maintaining a cartel. Id. 
 98. Id. at 79.  
 99. See id. at 60–94. He acknowledges that evidence of this kind already plays a role in price-
fixing cases, but argues it is often handled poorly, and used in addition to proof of actual agreement. 
See id. at 93–94. 
 100. Id. Posner argues, “[i]f the economic evidence presented in a case warrants an inference of 
collusive pricing, there is neither legal nor practical justification fore requiring evidence that will 
support the further inference that the collusion was explicit rather than tacit.” Id. at 94.  
 101. Id.  
 102. See generally id. at 51–99.  
 103. Lopatka, Turner’s Try, supra note 46, at 908 (quoting a Letter from Donald Dewey to John 
E. Lopatka (Mar. 21, 1996) (on file with Lopatka)).  
 104. Id. at 895. According to Lopatka, Turner’s view that firms in concentrated markets will 
quickly recognize the inevitable lost profits from price-cutting and choose to maintain the higher price, 
is countered by Posner’s assertions about information asymmetries between the firms that make 
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that Posner’s two-step, multifactor approach105 will, without a doubt, 
confuse the courts more than the current plus factors analysis does.106  
Further, Lopatka construes the game theory literature to support 
Turner’s notion more than Posner’s.107 Posner and other commentators 
find the game theory literature less informative. they contend either that 
game theory adds nothing to the debate,108 or that it simply confirms the 
notion that many outcomes, including parallel pricing, are possible in a 
concentrated market.109 Some commentators find support in game theory 
for an approach opposed to the orthodox Turner view. Gregory Werden 
asserts that though prices may be inflated above the levels that would be 
dictated by perfect competition, monopoly pricing will not occur naturally 
unless the market is an actual monopoly.110 He also asserts that self-
temporary “chiseling” profitable and competitive. Id. at 895–96. The weakness in these arguments, 
Lopatka contends, is that Turner’s may be overbroad and Posner’s too dependent on the assumptions 
made about market structure and firm access to information. Id. Lopatka distills the argument in terms 
of assumptions: “Turner assumes that firms would take into account their rivals’ swift reactions to any 
price cut and would therefore conclude that a price cut would be unprofitable.” Id. at 895. Conversely,  
Posner adopts a different set of assumptions. . . . Posner does not assume that firms would 
ignore their rivals’ reactions, but that they would anticipate different reactions; he assumes 
that rivals’ price drops would neither be certain nor immediate. . . .[G]iven the right set of 
assumptions, firms acting unilaterally will maximize profit only when pricing competitively. 
Id. at 895–96.  
 105. See supra notes 96, 97 and accompanying text.  
 106. Id. at 902. Lopatka argues that “[w]ere Posner’s approach adopted, courts would confront 
different questions, but their task would not be appreciably simpler. They would have to decide 
whether defendants colluded, possibly explicitly but likely only tacitly, based on a welter of confusing, 
inconsistent, and ambiguous pieces of economic evidence.” Id. Lopatka acknowledges, however, that 
Turner’s proposal to attack concentration using section 2 of the Sherman Act has not been accepted in 
the legislature or courts. Id at 903.  
 107. Id. at 896. Lopatka observes that “game theory does suggest that interdependent pricing at 
supracompetitive levels is likely to be more prevalent . . . than perhaps Posner acknowledges.” Id.  
 108. See supra note 89.  
 109. See F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 220 (3d ed. 1990) (“[G]ame theory has yet to yield compelling mechanistic solutions 
to oligopoly pricing problems. . . . It confirms the notion emerging from traditional theory that 
‘anything can happen’ in oligopoly, depending upon firm conjectures about rival behavior, and it 
suggests that those conjectures depend crucially on past interactions in an uncertain environment.”); 
Carl Shapiro, The Theory of Business Strategy, 20 RAND J. ECON. 125, 126 (1989) (“The fact of the 
matter is that competitive strategy in practice encompasses a wide variety of strategic and tactical 
decisionmaking . . . . There is no reason to expect or strive for a single unified oligopoly theory that 
would deliver unique predictions to armchair theorists, independent of the particulars of how 
competition is played out in a given industry.”).  
 110. Werden, Collusion, supra note 36, at 760. Werden explains the teaching of the Nash non-
cooperative equilibrium, one of several game theory models developed by Nobel Prize-winning 
mathematician and economist John F. Nash Jr.: 
Nash, non-cooperative equilibrium in one-shot game oligopoly models, is viewed by 
economists as depicting a best-case scenario (from society’s perspective), in the sense that 
economists do not expect competition to be more intense than this over the long term. . . . 
Prices are not expected to equal the short-run marginal cost of production, as in the textbook 
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interest may dictate reducing prices, even if those price cuts are matched 
by competitors.111 Thus, Werden argues, “[c]ourts can avoid the worst 
pitfalls simply by recognizing that, in the absence of an agreement, 
monopoly prices cannot be expected to emerge from oligopoly.”112  
Thomas Piraino presents a third response to the debate, attractive in its 
simplicity, proposing a “purpose-based” approach to regulating oligopoly 
conduct.113 Piraino argues that game theory explains how firms can use 
signals within the market, such as announcements about future price 
increases, to communicate with the other members of the oligopolistic 
market, and thus move prices towards supracompetitive levels without 
coming under the purview of the Sherman Act.114 Piraino directs courts to 
question the reason for practices like signaling in light of the industry in 
question. If legitimate, non-collusive reasons exist for the practice, the law 
should not enjoin them; and, if no legitimate purpose exists, then the 
practice should be enjoined.115 This approach, Piraino maintains, will 
“play to the federal courts’ analytical strengths,” by focusing them on 
questions such as the defendant’s purpose and motivation, which “they are 
well equipped to resolve.”116
model of perfect competition. . . . Prices well in excess of short-run marginal cost often may 
be required for the complete recovery of fixed costs and achievement of a competitive rate of 
return on investment. 
Id. at 760–61. 
 111. Id. at 770. As Werden explains, “Game theory teaches that pursuit of self-interest may mean 
cutting price, even if others match price cuts immediately and with certainty.” Id.  
 112. Id at 780. Werden proposes courts take more seriously economic literature when ruling on 
expert-testimony admissibility motions in complex antitrust cases. Id. at 798.  
 113. See generally Piraino, Oligopoly Conduct supra note 36. For further explication of Piraino’s 
“purpose-based” approach to antitrust regulation, see generally Thomas A. Piraino Jr., Identifying 
Monopolists’ Illegal Conduct Under the Sherman Act, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 809 (2000). Piraino asserts 
that the focus on economic analysis established by the Chicago School in the 1970s has created an 
unfortunate loophole for tacit colluders who can rely on subtle signals within the marketplace to 
maintain supracompetitive price levels without coming to any agreement that would be actionable 
under the antitrust laws. Piraino, Oligopoly Conduct, supra note 36, at 13–14. Piraino argues that 
Chicago School antitrust policy, though it protects many beneficial forms of competition, has also 
“given oligopolists free rein to engage in tacit price-fixing arrangements harmful to consumers.” Id. at 
14. Regarding the Monsanto / Matsushita summary judgment standard, Piraino contends that “lower 
federal courts have interpreted [Monsanto and Matsushita] to preclude fact finders from inferring a 
price-fixing conspiracy from circumstantial evidence.” Id. This high standard, Piraino maintains, has 
“left such conduct completely unregulated.” Id. 
 114. Id. at 19–20. 
 115. Id. at 32–39. Piraino contrasts price announcements by an airline, which may do so in order 
to inform customers about future prices and thus allowing customers to plan future for future expenses, 
with a gas station, which has no reason to announce future price increases, other than to seek the 
cooperation of its competitors. Id.  
 116. Id. at 39.  
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D. In the Courts: Smoking Guns and Plus Factors 
Federal courts have analyzed the issues raised by the “oligopoly 
problem” with varying approaches.117 Although all courts apply 
essentially the same test involving parallel behavior and plus factors, some 
circuit courts take disparate views of the probative value of both kinds of 
“plus factor” evidence, including economic evidence dealing with market 
behavior, as well as “traditional evidence of conspiracy.”118 The following 
cases illustrate this divergence.  
1. Williamson Oil 
The Eleventh Circuit’s recent opinion in Williamson Oil Co. v. Phillip 
Morris USA119 presents a perspective of plus factor analysis influenced 
entirely by the Turner position that parallel pricing is unavoidable in a 
highly concentrated market. Plaintiffs based much of their case on 
evidence of “signaling” between the companies about price changes after 
Phillip Morris drastically reduced prices in response to declining market 
shares for its premium brand, Marlboro.120 This evidence of 
communication was dismissed out of hand by the court, informed largely 
by its view that the lockstep pricing moves were merely “rational, lawful, 
parallel pricing behavior that is typical of an oligopoly.”121 Thus, because 
the court viewed the pricing behavior as natural in a highly concentrated 
market, any communication was deemed irrelevant.122  
 117. See id. at 12 (“The split among antitrust commentators is reflected in the federal courts, 
which have delivered a series of confused and conflicting decisions on oligopoly conduct.”); Werden, 
Collusion, supra note 36, at 719 (“In a spate of recent cases with divergent outcomes, courts of appeals 
have evaluated attempts to establish collusion largely on the basis of economic evidence.”). 
 118. See supra notes 46–57 and accompanying text. 
 119. 346 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003).  
 120. Id. at 1293–96. 
 121. Id. at 1310.  
 122. Id. Pushed to its logical conclusion, defendants in this case could have agreed on price and 
avoided liability if the pricing moves they agreed to mirrored what the court believed to be natural 
oligopoly pricing. Indeed, the court characterized the outcome of the alleged “signaling” as follows: 
“[T]he ultimate outcome of all of the statements and actions that appellants label signals was to return 
the tobacco industry from the pricing chaos that followed Marlboro Friday to a ‘traditional normal 
oligopoly,’ which, of course, is perfectly legal.” Id. at 1306 (citation omitted).  
 The court’s choice of the phrase “pricing chaos” is a strange one, particularly considering the 
well-accepted goal of antitrust policy to serve consumer welfare by keeping prices at competitive 
levels. Pricing chaos could clearly be viewed as “competition.” From the perspective of its statements 
about “pricing chaos,” the court appears to view oligopoly pricing as not only unavoidable but also 
laudable. In this respect, the decision goes beyond Turner’s view, which acknowledged the 
unavoidability of the conduct, but did not bless it in this manner. 
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The court was also quick to dismiss plaintiffs’ economic evidence as 
mere “indicia that the tobacco industry is an oligopoly, which is perfectly 
legal.”123 Further, the court handicaps its ability to assess any assertions of 
economic evidence at the outset of its analysis, noting that it “must 
exercise prudence in labeling a given action as being contrary to the 
actor’s economic interests, lest we be too quick to second-guess well-
intentioned business judgments of all kinds.”124 In line with the 
Matsushita standard, the court also explains that “[e]quipoise is not 
enough to take the case to the jury.”125 None of the plaintiffs’ assertions 
regarding economic evidence,126 which in part mirror Posner’s second set 
of factors127 and may point towards collusion, are given serious weight by 
the court.128 Much of the court’s analysis is based on Turner’s view of the 
economic realities of concentrated markets; indeed, reading only 
Williamson Oil, the uninitiated reader would have no sense that an 
opposing view exists.129  
2. High Fructose Corn Syrup 
In stark contrast to the Eleventh Circuit’s approach in Williamson Oil 
stands Judge Posner’s opinion in In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust 
Litigation.130 In a “plus factors” analysis consistent with his view in 
Antitrust Law,131 Posner asserts that two types of acceptable evidence 
 123. Id. at 1317.  
 124. Id. at 1310 (citing In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999)).  
 125. Id. 
 126. According to the lower court, plaintiffs in Williamson Oil offered seven actions which it 
considered indicative of collusion:  
(1) non-initiating Defendants always followed price increases; (2) after Marlboro Friday, 
B&W and RJR turned away from discount cigarettes; (3) RJR led, and Philip Morris 
followed, a price increase despite planning documents which reflected they would not take 
increases; (4) each Defendant exchanged information through [MSA]; (5) each Defendant had 
permanent allocation programs; (6) Philip Morris based settlement payments on market 
capitalization and not market share; and (7) Defendants agreed to pay “excessive” settlement 
price increases. 
Id. at 1310 (quoting Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 
1296 (N.D. Ga. 2002)).
 127. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.  
 128. For a more in-depth criticism of Williamson Oil, see Daniel R. Shulman, Williamson Oil v. 
Phillip Morris: Whatever Happened to Jury Trials?, 5 SEDONA CONF. J. 81 (2004).  
 129. Id. at 88 (“What is significant in the Williamson Oil decision is its total acceptance and 
embrace of the Turner position, without any acknowledgement of the contrary views of Judge 
Posner.”).  
 130. 295 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2002).  
 131. Posner as circuit judge takes the same perspective he advocates in the literature, employing 
the multi-factor approach. See supra notes 96, 97 and accompanying text. This approach is obviously 
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exist. First, relying on his seventeen factors to identify markets prone to 
collusion, Judge Posner recognizes as relevant “evidence that the structure 
of the market was such as to make secret price fixing feasible . . . .”132 
Secondly, Posner indicates the court will look to “evidence that the market 
behaved in a noncompetitive manner.”133  
Posner found legal significance in economic evidence that the price 
ratio of 9:10 between the prices of the two main high fructose corn syrups 
could not be explained by competitive forces.134 Posner also found 
persuasive that market shares remained stable despite industry growth135 
and that a regression analysis showed defendants’ prices were higher 
during the alleged conspiracy than market forces would explain.136 
Further, contrary to the court in Williamson Oil, Posner found evidentiary 
significance in numerous guilty-sounding statements by the defendants 
such as “[w]e have an understanding within the industry not to undercut 
each other’s prices,” and in the statement of the president of Archer 
Daniels Midland, involved in the alleged conspiracy at issue in this case, 
that “our competitors are our friends. Our customers are the enemy.”137  
informed by his view that parallel pricing is not unavoidable and is likely a product of communication 
and cooperation among the firms in the industry. See supra Part II.B.  
 132. High Fructose Corn Syrup, 295 F.3d at 655. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.  
 133. Id. Judge Posner also cautions against three traps, which Posner says “the defendants in this 
case have cleverly laid in their brief.” Id. at 655–56. These traps include (1) the temptation for the 
judge to weigh the evidence, (2) “suppos[ing] that if no single item of evidence presented by the 
plaintiff points unequivocally to conspiracy, the evidence as a whole cannot defeat summary 
judgment,” and (3) “failing to distinguish between the existence of a conspiracy and its efficacy.” Id. at 
655–56. These “traps” are laid in an effort to utilize the limiting language involved in the Monsanto 
and Matsushita summary judgment standard requiring evidence that “tends to exclude the possibility” 
of independent conduct. See id. Posner observes that the defendants in this case assert that because 
they sold their product below list price levels alleged to be established by a conspiracy, “even a bald-
faced agreement to fix list prices would not be illegal in this industry.” Id. at 656. 
 134. Id. at 658–59. Werden points out, however, that Posner uses a perfectly competitive market 
as his benchmark for comparing the price ratio established in this case, “neglecting to address whether 
the same would be true in a non-cooperative oligopoly and evidently treating as irrelevant whether the 
observed pricing was more consistent with monopoly than with competition. Werden, Collusion, supra 
note 36, at 758.  
 135. High Fructose Corn Syrup, 295 F.3d at 659–60. Posner here relies on the first of his 14 
factors that indicate collusion is occurring within a market. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.  
 136. Id. at 660–61. This observation is consistent with factor six in that price or output decisions 
changed during the alleged conspiracy and could not be explained by market forces. See supra note 97 
and accompanying text.  
 137. Id. at 662.  
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3. Flat Glass 
The Third Circuit’s decision in Flat Glass attempts to strike a balance 
between Turner and Posner’s approaches discussed above.138 First, it 
recognizes the distinction between the circumstance in Matsushita—a 
highly speculative predatory pricing scheme—and the collusive agreement 
alleged by the plaintiffs in this case.139 The court is also aware, however, 
that “despite the absence of the Matsushita Court’s concerns,” the Third 
Circuit and others have been “cautious in accepting inferences from 
circumstantial evidence in cases involving allegations of horizontal price-
fixing among oligopolists.”140 The court then explains the debate from 
both perspectives and proceeds through a standard plus-factors analysis.  
The court’s analysis does not view the alleged conspiracy with the 
incredulity of the Eleventh Circuit and employs some of the analysis 
advocated and employed by Judge Posner in High Fructose Corn Syrup, 
without subscribing to his theory entirely. Rather, the court uses Posner’s 
indicia of collusion as a way to examine the evidence, while comparing 
the evidence with that in precedent cases.141 The court notes that the 
industry was highly concentrated, and represents a “text book example of 
an industry susceptible to efforts to maintain supracompetitive prices.”142 
The court observes several economic indicators of collusion, but notes that 
the most significant evidence remains “non-economic evidence . . . 
involv[ing] customary indications of traditional conspiracy or proof that 
the defendants got together . . . .”143 The facts in Flat Glass provide 
sufficient indicators of “traditional conspiracy evidence,” which persuades 
the court to take a more receptive view of the economic indicators.144 
Were the physical evidence less persuasive,145 however, the court may 
have been less receptive.146  
 138. See In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2004).  
 139. Id. at 358. 
 140. Id. (citing Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1300–01 (11th Cir. 
2003); Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1042–43 (8th Cir. 
2000); In re Baby Food Antitrust Litigation, 166 F.3d 112, 121–22 (3d Cir. 1999); Clamp-All Corp. v. 
Cast Iron Soil Pipe Institute, 851 F.2d 478, 484 (1st Cir. 1988); Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 
246, 253–54 (2d Cir. 1987)).
 141. Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 361–69.  
 142. Id. at 361 (citing POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 8, at 69–79).  
 143. Id. at 361 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
 144. See id. at 361–69. 
 145. Id. at 368 (discussing In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 1999), as a case 
with “far less compelling” traditional evidence).  
 146. Id. at 361–69. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
At the heart of the debate surrounding parallel conduct in highly 
concentrated markets lies two interrelated issues. First, continuing 
uncertainty regarding the economics of oligopolistic markets leads to 
disparate judicial treatment. This seems in large part to depend on which 
theory a particular court is influenced by or which theory best fits that 
court’s understanding of the evidence before it.147 Courts familiar with 
Turner’s model of conscious parallelism seem unwilling to engage 
plaintiffs’ assertions that the conduct the court views as unavoidable may 
in fact be aided or facilitated by a form of communication or behavior that 
should be unlawful.148  
Second, the standard for summary judgment established in Monsanto 
and Matsushita demands courts view skeptically both economic and 
traditional conspiracy evidence. Because plaintiffs must show evidence 
that “tends to exclude the possibility that defendants acted independently,” 
plaintiffs presenting evidence that plausibly shows a fifty percent 
likelihood that defendants conspired will lose on a motion for summary 
judgment; that fifty percent likelihood will never be explored in most 
courts.149 In part, this skepticism is informed by the context of Monsanto 
and Matsushita, each of which involved allegations less plausible than a 
price-fixing conspiracy.150 However, the skepticism of Monsanto and 
Matsushita also reinforces the orthodox view that conscious parallelism is 
unavoidable: if judges are persuaded that such behavior occurs naturally, 
they are unlikely to view economic or even some traditional conspiracy 
evidence as “tending to exclude” the possibility that defendants acted 
independently. 
There are, of course, good reasons to maintain faith in the more 
orthodox Turner view. A wrongly-decided section 1 case carries not only 
the threat of treble damages (and attorney’s fees) for the defendants,151 but 
also presumably deters rational, pro-competitive conduct.152 If the 
defendants in a “tacit collusion” case did act independently, a wrongly 
decided case punishes them merely for running a business in a highly 
concentrated market. Further, the focus on agreements is a cornerstone of 
 147. See supra notes 119–46 and accompanying text. 
 148. See supra notes 119–29 and accompanying text. 
 149. See supra notes 36–50 and accompanying text. 
 150. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.  
 151. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.  
 152. Id.  
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antitrust enforcement,153 and, despite Posner’s analogizing tacit colluders’ 
parallel actions to the “meeting of the minds” that occurs in many 
enforceable non-verbal contracts,154 extending the theory of agreements to 
include this type of agreement creates an illusive and malleable concept 
that is unlikely to gain much traction in the courts.155 These concerns 
doubtlessly contribute to the current, rather complex, state of section 1 
enforcement.  
If Professor Turner is correct, the antitrust enforcement system has 
half-heartedly accepted his ideas. Though Turner asserts that conscious 
parallelism is an unavoidable byproduct of highly concentrated markets, 
he does not bless the concept.156 Rather, Turner argues for legislation 
allowing the government to deconcentrate these markets, allowing for a 
more competitive market system.157 Though the government’s policy 
towards mergers attempts to deter the creation of monopolies, it does not 
go as far as Turner advocates.158 Section 2 of the Sherman Act does 
attempt to deter firms from monopolizing a market; but section 2 is rarely, 
if ever in contemporary antitrust practice, used to deconcentrate 
oligopolistic markets.159 Thus, Turner’s theory that inefficiency is 
unavoidable in concentrated markets is employed to protect the 
oligopolists, but his solution to the problem is generally ignored.  
On the other hand, if Posner’s view is correct, then the courts are 
complicit in allowing oligopolists to maintain anticompetitive practices, 
damaging consumer welfare. These firms can escape accountability by 
concealing their agreement or understanding, or by having skilled 
attorneys able to present economic evidence in a way that colors the 
judge’s view of it as evidence of independent action.160 Posner doubts that 
there are many cases of purely tacit collusion,161 and suggests that 
agreements could be found given the right tools, but he advocates a 
refocusing of the policy towards an in-depth look into the market data.162  
 153. See supra notes 25–30 and accompanying text. 
 154. See supra notes 92–102 and accompanying text. 
 155. See Hovenkamp, Rationalization, supra note 12, at 922 (“In the paradigm oligopoly case, 
however, both the ‘offer’ and the ‘acceptance’ are implied; the common law rarely goes that far.”).  
 156. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.  
 157. Id. 
 158. See generally ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, supra note 20, at 680–87. 
 159. See id. 
 160. See supra Part II.B.  
 161. See POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 8, at 97.  
 162. See supra notes 95–102 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss1/4
p179 Bunda book pages.doc9/11/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] CONSCIOUS PARALLELISM 207 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As commentator responses suggest, this problem is unlikely to be 
resolved in the academy any time soon.163 Commentators disagree on the 
contributions of game theory to the debate. Some suggest that game theory 
merely acknowledges that markets can achieve the kind of 
supracompetitive equilibrium often seen in “conscious parallelism” 
cases,164 while others maintain that game theory explains the subtle 
communication process used by firms in highly concentrated markets.165 
Professors Lopatka and Werden disagree about the teachings of game 
theory regarding whether “conscious parallelism” is a likely outcome in a 
concentrated market, while each acknowledge that Posner’s use of “perfect 
competition” as a benchmark is unsupported by the literature.166  
Professor Piraino suggests inquiring into the purpose behind the signals 
and then only enjoining those without a legitimate, competitive business 
purpose.167 While attractive in its simplicity, Piraino’s proposal would 
likely fall victim to the same analysis that condemns most plaintiffs’ 
efforts in “conscious parallelism” cases: most businesses can articulate a 
reason why a particular pricing announcement had a legitimate business 
purpose. The court is again left to either substitute its own judgment for 
the legitimacy of the asserted business reason, or determine, presumably 
under the Matsushita standard, whether the evidence offered to prove that 
business purpose “tends to exclude” the possibility that the communication 
was intended for legitimate business purposes.  
The current state of federal court treatment of the issue, however, 
demands further investigation. Williamson Oil and Judge Posner’s opinion 
in High Fructose Corn Syrup represent two ends of a wide spectrum of 
court treatment of economic indicia of tacit collusion.168 The Third Circuit 
in Flat Glass is refreshingly candid in its acknowledgement of the debate, 
and its reasoning evidences an open-minded attitude toward economic 
evidence.169 Flat Glass, however, did not present the court with a difficult 
case involving these economic indicators of collusion: the “smoking gun” 
or “traditional conspiracy” evidence buttressed the economic data which 
suggested a collusive glass industry.170  
 163. See supra Part II.C. 
 164. See supra notes 109 and accompanying text.  
 165. See supra notes 113–16 and accompanying text.  
 166. See supra notes 107–12 and accompanying text. 
 167. See supra notes 113–16 and accompanying text.  
 168. See supra Parts II.D.1 & II.D.2.  
 169. See supra Part II.D.3. 
 170. Id. 
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The High Fructose Corn Syrup litigation arose out of a highly public 
conspiracy involving the lysine and corn syrup industries,171 and Judge 
Posner chose a relatively safe case in which to advance his method. In 
many cases, the “traditional conspiracy” evidence is likely less 
compelling. Ironically, however, as Williamson Oil demonstrates, courts 
take a more skeptical view of the probative value of even “traditional 
conspiracy” evidence when the court subscribes to the Turner view that 
parallel behavior is unavoidable.172 This is unacceptable. If defendants 
agree to fix prices, they have violated the Sherman Act. A consistently 
orthodox view of “conscious parallelism” doctrine, combined with a high 
threshold for plaintiffs to take cases to trial, however, prevents further 
judicial progress on the issue.  
IV. PROPOSAL 
This Note proposes a solution to guide the courts in better addressing 
the “oligopoly problem.” First, the government, through the Department of 
Justice or the Federal Trade Commission should utilize its ability to bring 
suits in equity to enjoin the practices that allegedly facilitate tacit 
collusion, including the practices identified by Posner as indicative of 
collusion and the game-theoretic signaling discussed by Piraino.173 
Proceeding in equity provides several advantages: (1) wrongly-decided 
decisions no longer subject innocent defendants to the severe penalties of 
treble damages and attorneys fees (the risk of deterring pro-competitive 
behavior looms large in any antitrust decision); (2) equity provides for a 
bench trial, likely in front of a sophisticated judge (rather than a lay jury 
who might not be familiar with economics), who has the incentive and 
skill to familiarize himself or herself with both the economic literature and 
the way in which the economic data is represented in each case; (3) lastly, 
the heavy burden laid upon plaintiffs by Matsushita does not operate in 
these equity suits, thus providing for a more probing investigation of the 
issues.  
 171. For a detailed account of the Archer Daniels Midland price-fixing conspiracy and the 
government’s investigation of the case, see KURT EICHENWALD, THE INFORMANT (Broadway Books, 
2000).  
 172. See supra Part II.D.1.  
 173. The focus here, however, departs from Piraino’s purpose-based approach, instead focusing 
on the economic consequences of the signaling, rather than engaging in an intent-based investigation 
of the company’s justification for the practice. See supra notes 113–16 and accompanying text.  
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The government may choose to seek aid from its well-developed and 
sophisticated approach to merger enforcement articulated in the Merger 
Guidelines, which instruct the government to proceed against mergers that 
produce certain levels of concentration, as indicated by Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index.174 If the government has reason to believe an industry is 
behaving in a suspiciously parallel fashion, and the industry is highly 
concentrated, it may seek to enjoin the practices possibly facilitating the 
collusion. If, as Turner suggests, there is nothing to enjoin, defendants can 
seek the injunction’s termination by showing the inefficient and 
burdensome results caused by the injunction. If the practices do facilitate 
collusion, enjoining such practices will improve market performance and 
the judiciary will gain understanding of the way in which these markets 
operate, allowing it to form a more coherent view towards the doctrine of 
“conscious parallelism.”  
V. CONCLUSION 
Solving the oligopoly problem is essential to an effective, coherent, and 
rational antitrust policy. If firms can avoid liability by masking their 
illegal conduct or by using the court’s reluctance to consider economic 
evidence seriously, then the policy must be reassessed. This Note does not 
advocate wholesale acceptance of Judge Posner’s proposals and assertions 
in the latest edition of Antitrust Law; rather, it urges courts to reconsider 
their stance towards economic evidence in price-fixing cases and proposes 
a means to probe the issue further, while avoiding many of the risks that 
 174. See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 45. Section 1.5 of the Merger Guidelines 
explains concentration and market shares in terms of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index:  
Market concentration is a function of the number of firms in a market and their respective 
market shares. As an aid to the interpretation of market data, the Agency will use the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) of market concentration. The HHI is calculated by 
summing the squares of the individual market shares of all the participants. Unlike the four-
firm concentration ratio, the HHI reflects both the distribution of the market shares of the top 
four firms and the composition of the market outside the four firms. It also gives 
proportionately greater weight to the market shares of the larger firms, in accord with their 
relative importance in competitive interactions.  
 The Agency divides the spectrum of market concentration as measured by the HHI into 
three regions that can be broadly characterized as unconcentrated (HHI below 1000), 
moderately concentrated (HHI between 1000 and 1800), and highly concentrated (HHI above 
1800). Although the resulting regions provide a useful framework for merger analysis, the 
numerical divisions suggest greater precision than is possible with the available economic 
tools and information. Other things being equal, cases falling just above and just below a 
threshold present comparable competitive issues.  
Utilizing the HHI index in this area will assist the government in aiming its efforts towards highly 
concentrated industries conducive towards tacitly collusive practices.  
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would accompany trying more of the cases under the current procedure. 
As Justice O’Connor recognized in State Oil Co. v. Khan,175 antitrust law 
is a dynamic field, open to change when society’s understanding of 
markets develops and requires metamorphosis. 
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